

genres such as the novel, the novella, and certain forms of drama. The book is well-written, well-argued, and well-researched—in short, a smart, well-executed monograph. In recent years there have been a number of articles and essay collections about the case in German literature, but to this author's knowledge, few, if any, monographs that treat this genre in the sustained fashion that Höcker does. For these reasons, Höcker's monograph makes a meaningful contribution to our field.

Because this book is a literary history, it does not offer in-depth analyses of the texts under consideration; instead, it focuses on those aspects of the texts that support the overall trajectory that Höcker traces. Readers seeking detailed engagement with extensive secondary literature and exhaustive analysis of each novel should look elsewhere. Such analysis is not Höcker's aim. Instead, he offers us a higher-level argument tracing a literary trajectory that elucidates the interrelation of science and literature, in particular the relationship of psychology and observation to literature.

My only suggestion to improve an already strong book would be to rectify an omission that Höcker himself acknowledges in the introduction, namely the exclusion of nineteenth-century Realism from this trajectory. Höcker justifies this omission by arguing that Realism focuses not on the particular, as the scientific case does, but on "the general depiction of an average life" (19). Even if this claim were correct (and there are scholars of Realism who would dispute it, or at least describe it in more nuanced, complex terms), this would be an important stage to chart out in the overall trajectory that Höcker describes. It could offer an even more nuanced and complex trajectory of the relationship between individual case and general knowledge. Realism and Biedermeier are replete with "case-based" works—Droste-Hülshoff's *Die Judenbuche*, Raabe's *Stopfkuchen*, and Storm's "Aquis Submersus" are but a few examples—and leaping over this period and these examples is a missed opportunity for Höcker's otherwise persuasive and impressive literary history.

In spite of this omission, this is an extremely valuable contribution to our field and will be a useful resource for both advanced scholars and graduate students interested in genre history, epistemology and representation, and the interaction between literature and science.

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### **The Law of Poetry: Studies in Hölderlin's Poetics.**

*By Charles Lewis. Cambridge: Legenda, 2019. xii + 210 pages + 2 b/w images. £75,00 / \$99.00 / €85,00 hardcover, £9,99 / \$12.50 / €12,50 paperback.*

From his novelistic and theoretical prose through his poems, translations, and commentaries, an emphasis upon "law" or "Gesetz" traverses Friedrich Hölderlin's oeuvre. But if Hölderlin's writing would seem to trace out a "law" of poetry, his various formulations for such a law also indicate that it could not be posited or established with an unequivocal formula. As Charles Lewis observes in his analysis of the poetological ode from 1800/1801, "Natur und Kunst oder Saturn und Jupiter," Hölderlin's poem does not simply suggest a relation between "our" practice of law-giving and the ruling arts ("Herrscherkünste") of Jupiter in the final stanza:

Dann hör' ich dich, Kronion! und kenne dich,  
den weisen Meister, welcher, wie wir, ein Sohn

der Zeit, Geseze giebt und, was die  
Heilige Dämmerung birgt, verkündet. (qtd. 43)

For these same lines also speak before and beyond Jupiter's reign, in that they address his provenance from Saturn (*Krónos*) and from time (*chrónos*)—already with the patronymic, “Kronion”—and thereby expose the contingency of his very existence upon another. Nor does the poet need to wait for permission to name Jupiter's predecessor and unsettle his exclusive sovereignty: rather, when the poem does speak of such permission at all, it is named as the condition for Jupiter's ability to remain, but not for the singer's liberty to speak: “Und willst du bleiben, diene dem Aelteren, / und gönn es ihm, daß ihn vor Allen, Göttern und Menschen, der Sänger nenne!” (qtd. 44). Hence, Lewis concludes, “it is clear that the concept of a poetic ‘law’ is central to Hölderlin's poetics,” yet if “the poet is construed as a lawgiver, the laws in question must differ from the bright commandments of the [Olympian] god. They must also share in the character of Saturn's twilight realm” (45–46).

Throughout the first and longest part of his monograph, Lewis elucidates the implications of this twilight zone for Hölderlin's poetics, tracing the ways in which a range of texts penned by Hölderlin between the years 1797 and 1805 reflect a “poetics” whose “ideal” is “to unite the exactness of thought and the willed ambiguity of poetic utterance” (143). This part comprises six chapters that explore 1) Hölderlin's epistolary novel *Hyperion*; 2) his ode “Natur und Kunst oder Saturn und Jupiter”; 3) his draft materials outlining a doctrine of the “Wechsel der Töne”; 4) his remarks on Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Antigone*; 5) his theoretical fragment on the (paradoxical) “Bedeutung” of tragedy; and 6) his nine *Pindarfragmente* and *Nachtgesänge*. Lewis's focus in each chapter upon a specific text or textual complex allows him to work out Hölderlin's articulations of “poetic law” through detailed commentaries, while offering new readings of those passages which he examines. Characteristic of those readings is Lewis's attentiveness to the ways in which Hölderlin develops his poetic thinking in dialogue with other writers and “genres” (12). In his first chapter, for example, Lewis advances the claim that *Hyperion*'s Plato-inspired praise of “Athenian culture” as the “embodiment” of an “ideal” beauty gives way to a Stoic affirmation of “all aspects of nature, including its suffering and imperfections,” which is arrived upon through the practice of writing itself: “indem ich diß erzähle” (19, qtd. 22). In this respect, Hölderlin's epistolary narrative displays an affinity with Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*, which similarly present a “kind of ethical self-constitution” that is achieved through writing (25). Yet whereas the Stoic emperor nevertheless seeks to establish a calm “citadel” in the mind (26), Hölderlin's writer-protagonist explicitly locates “sanctuary” in “the process of narrative reflection” (26).

The further echoes of Stoicism that Lewis recognizes in Hölderlin's poems are likewise analyzed in ways which suggest that Hölderlin's adoptions of philosophical language displace its significance by inscribing it within poetic texts whose “laws” allow for more and other possibilities to be articulated than those which “philosophical doctrine” alone would permit (33). Thus, the parallels that Lewis discovers between Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus and the ode “Natur und Kunst oder Saturn und Jupiter” are shown to expose the limits of Cleanthes' “premise, namely the identity of the ‘reason’ or ‘law’ of Zeus with the laws governing universal nature” (33), insofar as Hölderlin's ode points beyond Zeus to his predecessor, Kronos, and thereby advocates for a

“language [. . .] that does justice to the previously unspoken aspect of nature, one that escapes the order of Zeus” (35).

While classical sources largely inform his study, Lewis’s commentaries also chronologically move forward from Hölderlin to register the resonance of his *œuvre* with recent theoretical writing, and vice versa. In his third chapter, Lewis offers suggestive insights into the ways in which “Hölderlin’s construction of a double series of ‘tones’” in his manuscripts on the “Wechsel der Töne” might be drawn into connection with “Deleuze’s account” in the *Logique du sens* “of the serial structures that generate incorporeal ‘sense’” (77). Just as the latter thinker affirms “a ‘paradoxical’ or ‘nonsensical’ element, circulating between [. . .] series and ensuring their communication,” Lewis finds the inclusion of such an element to affect Hölderlin’s calculus of tonal modulations as well, resting as it does upon the premise that “die Begründung und Bedeutung des Gedichts [. . .] sich [. . .] dadurch [auszeichnet], daß sie sich selber überall entgegengesetzt ist” (qtd. 78). If, moreover, this paradox would indicate yet another way in which “precision” is conditioned by “ambiguity” in Hölderlin’s articulations of “poetic law” (143), Lewis’s precise commentaries on the openness of Hölderlin’s texts to other texts also expose another incalculable dimension of his writing.

When Lewis goes on to address Hölderlin’s translations and commentaries on ancient texts in the last three chapters of his book, the textual complexities that he unfolds increase, along with an emphasis upon the relative and historical character of poetic “law.” After arguing, for example, that Hölderlin’s usage of the term “moyen” in his “Anmerkungen zum Ödipus” may have been drawn from Nicolas Boileau’s translation of Pseudo-Longinus’s treatise on the sublime, where the word had appeared in an early, programmatic passage on the need to show “*comment et par quels moyens ce que nous enseignons se peut acquérir*” (qtd. 86; italics in original), Lewis probes the consequences of this relation for reading Hölderlin’s opening call for “gesetzlichen Kalkul” in his remarks on *Oedipus* (qtd. 88). On the one hand, Boileau could then be considered to offer a “precedent” for Lewis’s interpretation of “moyen” in Hölderlin to mean not a “medium,” but the “method” that “enables something to appear or become knowable” (85–86). On the other hand, Hölderlin’s interest in this word from Boileau and Pseudo-Longinus would be telling for his understanding of the sublime: whereas “eighteenth-century discourse on the Sublime” will have largely emphasized the “concept of ‘enthusiasm,’” Hölderlin seems to zero in upon Boileau’s and Pseudo-Longinus’s insistence on “the just proportion between rule and spontaneity” (89). Beyond these implications, however, Lewis also shows Hölderlin’s possible “citation” of Boileau to be significant because Boileau’s text exemplifies a modern translation that negotiates the historical “distinction between ancient Greek, and modern or ‘Hesperian’ poetic representation,” as Hölderlin had also sought to do by this means (98, 135). If Hölderlin had inaugurated his negotiations of this difference in his “Anmerkungen” with reference to Boileau, this gesture would thus reiterate the affirmation of translation and commentary as a means for various “poetics of representation” to be explored and with them, the “limits” of each “culture” (138). Yet at the same time, the unmarked character of this Boileau “citation” would also introduce foreignness and ambiguity into Hölderlin’s “proper” explications of the “gesetzlichen Kalkul” that should distinguish ancient poetics, troubling any straightforward formulation of that very lawfulness, and demonstrating the historical and

linguistic differences that are at stake in his remarks to be irreducible to a duality such as “ancient” Greek and “modern” German poetry.

The achievements of the first part of Lewis’s monograph are complemented by a second part consisting of a new translation into English of both Hölderlin’s “Sophocles-Anmerkungen” and his fragment on “[d]ie Bedeutung der Tragödien,” along with extensive notes contextualizing Hölderlin’s interpretive gestures within his broader oeuvre as well as within current debates in classical philology. In this respect, Lewis’s translations mediate not only between Hölderlin’s German and modern English, but also between a poetic commentary from the early nineteenth century and contemporary scholarship, continuing the “poetic logic” that he traces in Hölderlin, whose precise formulations also open to other voices before and after “his” time. The proximity of Lewis’s English rendition to Hölderlin’s German, as well as his erudite commentaries, will also make his translations a resource for future scholars and readers of Hölderlin.

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### **Zur Wiedervorlage. Eichendorffs Texte und ihre Poetologien.**

Herausgegeben von Claudia Liebrand und Thomas Wortmann. München: Fink, 2020. 329 Seiten. €112,00 broschiert oder eBook.

### **Eichendorffs Dichtersprache. Wörter, Wendungen, Motive. Ein Lexikon.**

Von Otto Eberhardt. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2019. 541 Seiten. €68,00.

If one were to feign a measure of etymological naiveté, one might reflect that the terms “Dichtersprache” and “Poetologie” as they appear in these two titles could refer to more or less the same concept. It quickly transpires that they designate diametrical opposites. Otto Eberhardt’s “Lexikon” gathers up the inherited consensus and puts it in accessible alphabetical order. “Dichtersprache” in that context signifies an enclosed body of references to convey details of usage and frequency with which hundreds of particularly significant lexical items occur. “Poetologien” designate the assertions about a body of texts by which one can break down the enclosures that traditionally confine their literary interpretation. This “Wiedervorlage” sets out to change the picture of Eichendorff as an unambiguous late romantic. Each volume would seem moved to add sophistication to our reading, but from a completely different premise. For those who grew up with the joyful familiarity that one acquires through learning a poem by heart as a schoolchild, neither book sustains or deepens that relationship with Eichendorff’s verse. For this reason one might see something of a missed opportunity in material the “Wiedervorlage” draws on from a previous generation. In his essay “Zum Gedächtnis Eichendorffs,” written for a radio broadcast in 1957, Theodor Adorno—one might say *even* Theodor Adorno if one had failed to notice that his critical dialectics also admit spontaneously enjoyed familiarity with a work of art—shows extreme reluctance to denigrate the immediacy of that childhood pleasure.

*Zur Wiedervorlage. Eichendorffs Texte und ihre Poetologien* recognizes Adorno’s thoughts as essential to its program of rendering Eichendorff, as the editors