Phenomenal Blackness: Black Power, Philosophy, and Theory. By Mark Christian Thompson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022. 208 pages. $26.00 paperback, $95.00 cloth, $25.99 e-book.

In Phenomenal Blackness: Black Power, Philosophy, and Theory, Mark Christian Thompson guides readers through a genealogical account of Black Power thought of the late 1960s, focusing in particular on the influence of German philosophy. Given the trendiness of French theory in the American academy in the 1970s and onward, the influence of German Critical Theory may surprise some readers, but Thompson points out the proximity of exiled thinkers who became influential in the U.S. after fleeing Germany. Arguably, the person who most closely interacted with traditional Critical Theorists is Angela Y. Davis, who studied under Theodor Adorno in Frankfurt and worked closely with Jürgen Habermas, Karl Heinz Haag, and Herbert Marcuse. Yet, Davis’s connection to the Frankfurt School is only explored in the penultimate chapter of the book. In the lead-up to it, Thompson provides concise overviews of evolving Black (Power) philosophy and how African American intellectuals engaged with other canonical German thinkers, such as G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. One of the main thrusts of Thompson’s work is the shift from a more anthropological or sociological analysis of race and race relations to one that is more driven by philosophy and theory, with figures such as James Baldwin, Amiri Baraka, Ralph Ellison, Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver, and Angela Davis taking up this approach. Central to the discursive engagement of African American thought with Critical Theory are the questions of aesthetics, autonomy, and freedom, especially as they relate to race. Mirroring some of the debates and disagreements in German philosophy, Black Power thought probes what exactly constitutes Black essence, particularly that of African America.

Much of the intellectual history that Thompson portrays is framed within larger disagreements among the German thinkers, especially between Gadamer and Habermas, and within the Hegel–Marx–Adorno trajectory. In Chapter One, Thompson focuses on the relationship between language, power, and ideology, highlighting how Baldwin’s view of white English—particularly the English of William Shakespeare—develops over time. Baldwin shares Gadamer’s emphasis on the linguisticality of all human behavior and the degree to which translation is one of the most complex cognitive processes and one of the most foundational for human interaction. Translation, on Gadamer’s reading, is not cultural, but rather culture itself. “The way in which a people translate themselves to other peoples in the medium of word and language is their culture. Cultural expression is thus one culture’s expression for another culture in a neutral language and in words with identifiable meaning for both peoples” (16). Baldwin and Gadamer agree on language’s emancipatory promise, even if language largely upholds a contingent status quo. As a matter of fact, language is arguably the only means to challenge such world-shaping dominance. Because of this, Baldwin reconciles himself with white English to a degree. While white English accounts for substantial shaping of Black lifeworlds, it is not merely oppressive, but becomes a means to an end in potentially translating one’s own experience and culture. Baldwin approaches “King’s English” like a foreign language, at first rejecting but later embracing it as linguistic means for self-expression and liberation.

In Chapter Two, Thompson recounts a similar evolution of thought about language, this time focusing on Malcolm X and his conceptualizations of the public sphere. On his reading, Malcolm X is more in line with someone like Foucault on questions of language and power, and in disagreement with Habermas, whose conceptualization of the public sphere is overly universalistic and monolithic. However, Malcolm diverges from Baldwin on the point of racial essence. They exhibit a similar view of language as both world-shaping and empowering, but the idea of racial essence is a moot point for Baldwin, whereas Malcolm discerns a lasting racial essence. Instead of reconciling through fallible translation, Malcolm posits a history of racial difference and seeks subversion of white domination.

Moving beyond paradigms of aesthetics and hermeneutics, Thompson lays out how Baraka posits racial phenomenology as transcendence in the blues in Chapter Three. Baraka sees the blues as quintessential to Black experience in the United States, similar to Malcolm X’s discernment of a Black essence throughout history. Unlike Baldwin and Ellison, who seek reconciliation and justice between races, Baraka seeks no dialogue in his focus on blues aesthetics. Thompson identifies Adorno as an interlocuter whose distinction between music and language is formative for Baraka’s understanding of artistic autonomy as embodied in the blues. Ignoring Adorno’s jazz essays, Baraka insists on the singularity of the blues and its ability to “escape the complete commodification of the culture industry” (81). Thompson then outlines evolving notions of autonomy in the exchange between Black Power thought and the Frankfurt School. Chapter Four recounts the formation of Cleaver’s thought in response to Marcuse’s theoretical claims in Eros and Civilization. Relaying Huey Newton’s proclamations of Black Panther Party ideology, Cleaver extends understandings of artistic autonomy into action plans for political autonomy, such as desire for a Black nation-state that no longer acquiesces to the need for white recognition. While Black Panther philosophy went to some lengths to distance itself from European forms of Marxism-Leninism, it did adopt Marxian views of the material necessity for revolution.

The final chapter centers on Davis, whose sustained personal interaction with Adorno and Marcuse puts her in a unique position among the thinkers featured in this book. One of the most intriguing questions Thompson’s book raises in this final chapter concerns the degree to which the two schools of thought made explicit reference to each other. While Thompson argues mutual familiarity with each other’s texts, the reader is occasionally left wondering how sustained (and mutual) such exchange was between Black Power thought and Critical Theory. Davis, in this context, takes on an exceptional role, since Adorno served as her advisor and she maintained a strong relationship with Marcuse. Driven—or even provoked—by Adorno, Davis goes beyond the Frankfurt School itself to take on Hegel’s teleological view of dialectics and history. She also grapples with Arendt, using “Hegel to condemn Arendt’s reading of Greek political thought on freedom and slavery” (136). It is in this final chapter that Thompson’s own voice becomes more apparent, arguing against readings that Davis downplayed theory for activism. Thompson corrects such claims, instead showing how her activism is borne out of this reversal of Hegel’s dialectics.

With Phenomenal Blackness, Thompson condenses what seems like a scattered discourse into a coherent narrative about Critical Theory’s impact on Black Power thought. The chapter outlining Davis’s more sustained interaction with Critical Theory is the most intriguing, but the book as a whole points out that her engagement was also preceded by others. One overarching theme that Thompson could explore more is the extent to which Critical Theory might have, in turn, been influenced by or responded to Black Power theory. But Phenomenal Blackness will be of interest to scholars and historians of African American studies as a discipline, social theorists in general, and of course, scholars of Critical Theory, Black Power intellectual history, and the Frankfurt School. Thompson has shed light on a rich intellectual exchange that has hitherto been overlooked, and readers will surely be curious to see future work on the topic.