

who therefore have to emancipate themselves as spectators. It is in such controversies that new theories from outside literary studies may cast a light on blind spots—thus illustrating their usefulness.

Chapter 9 then continues in this vein with Heine's *Heimkehr* poems, although the exercise is now one in "close reading." Here visibility (*Bildlichkeit*), spatiality (*Räumlichkeit*), and body-reference (*Körperlichkeit*) are the main focus, concentrating on the analysis of the so-called "Fensterszenen-Gedichte" (window scene poems), especially in their relationship to the image schema UP/DOWN. The tensions between inner and outer space are highlighted and set into relation with earlier research, revealing a different kind of dissonance than had hitherto been assumed.

Chapter 10 then investigates the extensive landscape descriptions in Stifter's short story *Bergkristall*, with special emphasis given to the characters and the narrator. Again the image schema of VERTICALITY is shown to play a predominant role, as well as the contrast outside/inside (*Außen/Innen*). The final chapter similarly examines these spatial constellations, now in Thomas Mann's *Der Zauberberg*.

For those who want to delve into this book, I can say that it is a thorough study—so thorough, in fact, that one sometimes wishes the author had been a little less thorough and a bit more imaginative. The author has spared neither time nor effort to build a comprehensive picture of the potential that awaits one in cognitive theory, ready to be directed toward literary problems and questions. It would have been helpful, though, if the book had an index of persons and subjects, given the extensive array of themes and positions.

My main reservation is the non-engagement of cognitive theory with empirical reality. This is not a shortcoming of Wege's work, but of the cognitive approach to literature generally. In Chapters 7 through 11, for instance, dozens of assertions are made about readers' processing and understanding of texts. But one wonders how anyone could know about such processes and their outcome without taking the trouble to look at how real readers do this. It is thoroughly to be hoped that cognitive approaches will finally probe real readers' processes of comprehension instead of relying on pure speculation.

Be that as it may, Wege's book is to be recommended for its thoroughness and richness of sources for readers with an interest in cognitive theory of literature.

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—Willie van Peer

### **Structures of Appearing: Allegory and the Work of Literature.**

By Brenda Machosky. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013. vii + 259 pages. \$55.00.

*Structures of Appearing* selects its material judiciously from a long history of writing that practices allegory as a literary device and reflects on the weakening of the authority, primarily the religious authority, on which allegorical signs originally depended. More importantly, it chronicles the burdening of literary institutions by philosophical claims as the receding tide of religion leaves allegory and symbol supposedly stranded and indeterminate in literary texts. To make this critical endeavor work as a basis for her study, Brenda Machosky really should also have provided an explicit critique of that expansion of philosophy into literary terrain. The recommen-

dation that we should “stop reading metaphorically” (190) represents a strange abandonment of literature and an even odder attitude toward human expression. Interesting though they may be, the many statements cited here undermining and undoing allegory as a specific literary device steadfastly refuse to acknowledge its place either in language or literature as real phenomena. It is not clear how we should situate the occasional commentary quoted or gesture made in defense of literature since the reasoning would seem to deprive literary meanings of any independence. Certainly, there is no resistance offered on the philosophical level to this diminution of literary meanings. That is a pity, as the text contains all the material necessary for a far more significant study critiquing rather than reiterating well-established positions. Moreover, it is not hard to show exactly where the opportunities were lost.

The author conducts us in large steps from the early medieval period with Prudentius's *Psychomachia* through Dante and Spenser to the Baroque and to Baudelaire. The considerable effort the author has put into this aspect of the book has been accomplished conscientiously. The temptation to elevate a large claim about the nature or the structure of meaning on this basis, on the other hand, seems to have carried the project beyond that good conscience. The preserved wreckage of philosophical claims on the unphilosophical language of art lies all about us as lessons from which thoughtful readers take warning. The institutions of literature have adapted and changed and survive with undiminished vigor into our century. Polemics about their mortality have now proved mortal too. One wishes and wishes that the author might have found at least one colleague to go through the manuscript to sort through the difference between statements that still bear careful examination and those that do not. Some of the author's own assertions, unfortunately, do not even bear the first brush of attention, such as, most unfortunately, the opening statement.

Where was the editor when the author of this book starts with a definition of its topic that is no definition at all? We are told that allegory “refers to a way of saying or showing one thing and meaning another” and that “this very definition reveals the particular phenomenology of allegory” (1). It is certainly true that the literary device of allegory can be counted among the many, many ways of saying one thing and meaning another if one is content to separate saying and meaning in that way. The terminology has been moved around, however. This book will arrive at the position that everything in language that fits this “phenomenology” is in fact allegorical. But in language, something that is everything is also nothing. A widely circulated recording of Robert Frost catches him responding to a question from a student who suggested to him that poetry appeared to be “just another way of saying one thing and meaning another.” Frost pauses for a moment, though not for long, and responds in tones of an arctic forbearance: “Well . . . yes.” And yes, it is true. True also for any fiction, any metaphor, symbol, any lie, most figures of speech, diplomacy, and courtesy. Each of these offers a technique by which language produces a unique effect. As did the rhetorical effect of Frost's “Yes.” The connections that should hold the literary and the philosophical components of the book together in the term “allegory” turn out to dwell only in the rhetoric chosen by Walter Benjamin. That this rhetoric has also held others spellbound establishes precisely where this book could have achieved something new and impressive. It could in fact have reframed critical discourse to bring it up to date in its ability to speak about contemporary literature. That process of weaving a history from Prudentius to the realm of the “modern” dissolves

at the centerpoint of its argument. Which is to say, it dissolves with Walter Benjamin, and with the position ascribed to him that it is impossible to speak of allegory except allegorically (157).

The intended meaning of Machosky's unfortunate opening definition emerges where one expects it, in the concluding pages of the book. On page 184, to be exact, where it presents a "definition" that abandons the formally recognizable literary device, to specify allegory as the condition of language as such as long as we incline to think metaphorically. All that remains when we speak like this of all literature is to claim it as the site where its own impossibility can be demonstrated. On page 190 she discounts the definition of allegory as an extension of metaphor, which is, for example, how William Wordsworth explains its literary application. In place of a term designating a particular expressive form, we now confront allegory as the name of a metaphysical function revealing that as such "language itself is an empty form." Though the metaphysical questioning of language has countless sources, the investiture of allegory to name this empty condition emerges directly through Walter Benjamin's theology of language. Machosky accepts his account of a lost, alienated condition of secular language in his study of the German *Trauerspiel* as correctly identifying the "modern" meaning of the allegory, one that does not form a binary distinction between symbolic and allegorical modes. More significantly, she briefly but explicitly also adopts Benjamin's essay on Goethe's *Wahlverwandtschaften* (1924/25) as the foremost example of a critical reading that applies the principle of that alienation. Benjamin notoriously imposes a theological view denying any autonomous truth in this most secular of compositions. She declares that his reading will "show what it is" (170).

But having declared that Benjamin's critical procedure on *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* will "show what it is," *Structures of Meaning* breaks off and changes the subject. Several pages explicate Goethe's "Ein Märchen" instead, pointing out correctly but unsurprisingly that the story presents "an allegory of the symbol" (180). Benjamin operates a dialectics of the symbol in the *Wahlverwandtschaften* essay according to the principles he will more fully articulate with his theory of the allegory in the *Trauerspiel* study. He shatters the classical harmony of the composition into a thing of shards and, he claims, "zum Torso eines Symbols." Consistent with this theological devastation, Benjamin leaves no motif reconciled with the context Goethe elaborates for it in the language of his fiction because "[w]ahre Versöhnung gibt es in der Tat nur mit Gott."

This critical reinvention of allegorical signs can scarcely offer a novel as it "is." Nor indeed can the "selige Anschauung des göttlichen Namens" on which Benjamin rests his philosophy of literature in the *Wahlverwandtschaften* essay address either structure or appearing. But Machosky's book nonetheless offers something in its own structure close to an allegory of why the phenomenon of literature, and art in general, has grown so elusive to philosophy. Her opening paragraph sets the stage for that "phenomenology" by defining allegory as "the appearance of one thing in another thing which it is not" (1). Yet surely a "thing" does not appear in this manner. The section on Charles Baudelaire could have developed his relation to Poe as an exponent of allegory in a completely untheological universe—for example in Poe's inclusion of the "Haunted Palace" passage in the story Baudelaire admired so much, "The Fall of the House of Usher." It is precisely the non-appearance of the thing when mediated

by a substitution that produces what Poe always emphasized as the purpose of literary technique: an *effect*. Whether as an essence, a quality, a role or a function or a value of some entity, the text achieves this effect by the exclusion of the thing from appearance, instead representing its impression as a state of mind. Representing such states continues to distinguish literature from philosophy, and that distinction offers rather a significant obstacle to an argument that wishes we would “stop reading aesthetically” and “stop reading metaphorically” (190).

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—Marcus Bullock

### **Literarische Entdeckungsreisen. Vorfahren—Nachfahrten—Revisionen.**

Herausgegeben von Hansjörg Bay und Wolfgang Struck. Wien: Böhlau, 2012. 376 Seiten + 22 s/w Abbildungen. €49,90.

Der Sammelband vereint 20 Beiträge zu einem produktiven Motiv und Formprinzip der Literatur-, Kunst- und Filmgeschichte der Moderne mit historischem Schwerpunkt auf Werken des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts sowie der Gegenwartskünste. Anknüpfend an Hans Blumenbergs grundlegende Studie über den *Prozess der theoretischen Neugierde* betonen die Herausgeber den transgressiven Charakter neuzeitlicher *curiositas*, welche “die Entdeckungsreise zum Paradigma neuzeitlicher Erkenntnis” (11) und moderner Konzeptionen ästhetischer Erfahrung schlechthin habe werden lassen. Solche Ideale und “mythischen Wissenskonfigurationen” des radikal Neuen werden in diesem Zusammenhang grundsätzlich mit einem “imperiale[n] Begehren” (11) identifiziert, das durch literarische Inszenierungen sowohl reproduziert als auch “produziert” wird, und vor diesem Hintergrund mit der Entfaltung eines imperialen Kolonialismus im Verlauf der Neuzeit in enger Verbindung steht. Das Streben nach der “Überschreitung letzter Grenzen” territorialer ebenso wie ästhetischer oder epistemologischer Art zielt auf eine Destabilisierung bestehender Ordnungssysteme durch das außerhalb liegende Fremde und gleichzeitig auf dessen aneignende Integration in diese Ordnungssysteme. Die Kehrseite dieses zwiespältigen Impulses bestehe in einer immer schnelleren Abnutzung des Neuheitseffektes im Zuge der fortschreitenden Erfassung und Kartierung bestehender geographischer, kognitiver und ästhetischer Gebiete.

Vor diesem Hintergrund konstatieren Bay und Struck, dass ein solches Transgressionsparadigma spätestens ab 1900 schrittweise an Konjunktur verliere, da die Hoffnung, radikal unbekannte Räume und Phänomene zu finden, angesichts der zunehmenden Beseitigung ‘weißer Flecken’ auf den Landkarten geopolitischer Machtansprüche ebenso wie der Wissenschaften und der Künste immer öfter enttäuscht werden müsse. Das latente Bewusstsein hiervon bedinge einen “ebenso verzweifelten wie paradoxen Wettlauf” nach der Entdeckung und Inbesitznahme vermeintlich noch unberührter “Extremräume[]” (11), zu denen einerseits Naturräume wie “Polarregionen und die höchsten Gebirge,” andererseits—im Sinne eines klassischen kolonialen Phantasmas auf Erschließung wartender “jungfräuliche[r]” (12) Gebiete—die letzten noch nicht in koloniale Einflussphären eingeordneten Territorien zählten. Der korrespondierende Wunsch, aus dem Kreislauf bzw. der “Totschlägerreihe (Kafka)” unzähliger historisch vorgeprägter “Nach-Fahr(t)en” und intertextuell vorbestimmter “Vor-Schriften” (12) auszubrechen, werde auch auf ästhetischer Ebene nahezu